

At an IAS Term, Part 8 of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, held in and for the County of Kings, at the Courthouse, at Civic Center, Brooklyn, New York, on the 12th day of January, 2012

P R E S E N T:

HON. BERT A. BUNYAN,

Justice.

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IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
ANTHONY SCIALO,

Petitioner,

- against -

Index No. 1987/11

SALVATORE CASSANO, AS THE FIRE COMMISSIONER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE 1-B PENSION FUND, AND THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, ARTICLE 1-B PENSION FUND,

Respondents.

For a Judgment pursuant to Article 78, CPLR, to review and annul the determination made by respondents to retire petitioner without providing for a pension for said petitioner at not less than three quarters of his salary as of the date of his service retirement as required by law, and for a further order directing payment of such pension retroactive to the date of his service retirement, and for such other appropriate relief.

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The following papers numbered 1 to 3 read herein:

	<u>Papers Numbered</u>
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause/ Petition/Cross Motion and Affidavits (Affirmations) Annexed _____	<u>1 - 2</u>
Verified Answer _____	<u>3</u>
Reply Memorandum _____	_____
_____ Affidavit (Affirmation) _____	_____
Other Papers <u>Memoranda of Law</u> _____	_____

Upon the foregoing papers, petitioner Anthony Scialo (Scialo) moves:

1. For a judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR:
 - A. reviewing and annulling the action of the respondents herein in denying petitioner an accident disability retirement allowance (ADR) pursuant to the Administrative Code § 13-353 and declaring said action to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and unlawful; and
 - B. directing and ordering the respondents to retire petitioner with an accident disability retirement allowance, retroactive to the date of his service retirement together with interest; or, in the alternative,
 - C. directing a remand of petitioner's case for review by the respondents using the proper legal standard;
2. For an order pursuant to CPLR 2307(a) directing respondents to serve and file:

A. all reports, recommendations, certificates and all other documents submitted to the Fire Pension Fund in connection with the petitioner's application herein;

B. copies of the minutes of each meeting of said fire Pension Fund Board of Trustees wherein petitioner's accident disability retirement application was considered, discussed or acted upon; and

C. copies of any and all medical records, reports or notes relating to petitioner which are on file with the Fire Pension Fund and/or the New York City Fire Department Bureau of Health Services including all pre-employment documentation.

This Article 78 proceeding results from a denial of petitioner's ADR application by the 1-B Medical Board of the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund, Subchapter 2 (the Medical Board). The Medical Board's decision was rendered after a court ordered remand of petitioner's case in *Scialo v Scopetta, et. al.*, Civil Index No. 20948/08 (Kings Sup. Ct. April 7, 2009) by Hon. Bert A. Bunyan. In *Scialo*, this court remanded the matter to the Medical Board for further review and findings with regard to petitioner's claimed line-of-duty right knee injuries as the court held that the Medical Board's "no disability" decision was not adequately explained.

BACKGROUND

The underlying facts of this matter follow, in abbreviated form, as taken from the court's April 7, 2009 decision. The facts relevant to the instant Article 78 proceeding are stated afterward in full. For a full recitation of the underlying facts, please refer to the court's prior decision above cited.

On May 7, 1983, petitioner was appointed to the uniformed force of the NYFD and served continuously as a member until his retirement. At all relevant times, petitioner was a member of the NYFD Pension Fund. Petitioner first injured his right knee on September 27, 1984 while working at a building that had collapsed. While stepping off of a portable ladder, petitioner slipped on debris from the collapse and twisted his right knee.

Petitioner's second injury to his right knee occurred on April 10, 2000 while he was responding to a motor vehicle collision. As one of the vehicles abruptly lurched, petitioner dove out of the way, slipping on broken glass and spilled fluids. As he fell to the ground, he felt a sharp pain in his right knee. On April 14, 2000, an MRI of petitioner's right knee was taken by Sam Mayerfield, M.D., a radiologist. On May 4, 2000, as a result of the pain in his knee and the MRI findings of Dr. Mayerfield, petitioner was evaluated by Jo A. Hannafin, M.D. Dr. Hannafin confirmed that Scialo "has a history and exam consistent with medial and lateral meniscal pathology and a questionable partial ACL..." Dr. Hannafin recommended an arthroscopy to repair the damage to petitioner's right knee. Dr. Hannafin performed the arthroscopic procedure on May 17, 2000. [Her] post-operative diagnosis was, "[a] complex medial meniscal tear, partial anterior cruciate ligament injury without instability and synovitis." At the time of his surgical followup on October 4, 2000, Dr. Hannafin cleared Scialo for return to full duty. This injury and subsequent surgery caused petitioner to lose 180 days of work, from April 11, 2000 until October 8, 2000.

Petitioner subsequently injured his right knee a third time. . . on September 3, 2002 when a set of basement stairs he was climbing collapsed, causing him to fall into the basement of the premises. According to the petitioner's medical history, this incident resulted in his missing 46 days of work.

On April 14, 2004, petitioner submitted an application for ADR for injuries he allegedly sustained in the line of duty, including the injuries to his knee sustained in April of 2000. In response to petitioner's application and on his behalf, the Fire Commissioner submitted an application for non-service incurred disability retirement, also referred to as ordinary disability retirement (ODR). Petitioner also submitted an application for Service Retirement since he had 20 years of service as a member of the FDNY. Petitioner retired on May 21, 2004, after 22 years of service, with a service pension.

On May 17, 2004, just five days prior to his retirement, petitioner underwent another MRI of his right knee. Narendra Patel, M.D., a radiologist, concluded that petitioner exhibited: (1) status post partial meniscectomy of the posteromedial meniscus; (2) suspect partial incomplete tear of the femoral

attachment of the anterior cruciate ligament with buckling of the posterior cruciate ligament; (3) a small intrasubstance tear of the posterolateral meniscus; (4) mild tendinitis of the infrapatellar tendon and (5) mild bone marrow edema of the posteromedial tibial condyle. On May 21, 2004, the same day he was retired by the FDNY, petitioner was examined by his treating physician, [Dr. Hannafin], the same doctor who performed the arthroscopic surgery on his knee. The purpose of this examination was for a followup evaluation and to determine the status of his right knee. According to Dr. Hannafin, after his surgery, “[petitioner] subsequently had a somewhat slow postoperative course with recurrence of an effusion within the knee.” Dr. Hannafin finished [her] report with the following impression, “Mr. Scialo has a history and examination consistent with early posttraumatic arthrosis of the medial compartment of his knee. . . [t]he status of his knee, as documented on [the] current [5/17/2004] MRI, is directly related to the injury that he sustained in 2000 and the subsequent partial medial meniscectomy.”

On June 14, 2004, petitioner was examined by the FDNY Medical Board Committee (the BHS Committee) which stated that petitioner should perform light duty and had a partial permanent disability. Specifically, quoting from respondents’ answer, the BHS Committee found petitioner “unfit for fire duty with a diagnosis of . . . status post right knee arthroscopy with medial meniscectomy and ACL tear.” As indicated by his stamped endorsement on the June 14, 2004 BHS Committee report, the Fire Commissioner submitted an application for ODR. Nearly two years later, on March 2, 2006, the Medical Board first reviewed Scialo’s application for ADR. The Medical Board referred Scialo to its impartial orthopedic consultant, Dr. Basil Dalavagas, to determine if he had a disability of his right knee that would preclude full fire duty. Dr. Dalavagas examined petitioner on May 11, 2006. His report notes that a “[r]eview of the patient’s X-Ray shows no significant degenerative changes in the knee. . .” and, “. . . in the MRI done in May/2004, there was evidence of S/P meniscectomy, partial, and there was evidence of partial ACL [anterior cruciate ligament] tear and questionable buckling of the PCL [posterior cruciate ligament].” Dr. Dalavagas also found right quadriceps muscle atrophy that he felt could be corrected with intensive physical therapy. Despite these findings, Dr. Dalavagas found that the petitioner was “not permanently disabled for the performance of full fire duty. On June 15, 2006, based upon Dalavagas’ May 11, examination, the Medical Board denied petitioner’s application for ADR.

On October 3, 2006, in response to his being denied an ADR for his back and knee injuries, petitioner went to Dr. Hannafin for a reevaluation of his right knee. After his examination, Dr. Hannafin concluded that “Mr. Scialo

is continuing to have symptoms related to his knee. I have recommended to him that we repeat the MRI of his knee as his prior one has been almost two years. We would like to see whether he has had any further loss of articular cartilage in the medial compartment, or whether he is beginning to develop any subchondral edema from overload of the bone." On October 6, 2006, Douglas Mintz, M.D. performed a third MRI of petitioner's right knee. After reviewing the film, Dr. Mintz reported the following impression, "Magnetic resonance imaging of the right knee demonstrating medial meniscectomy, with focal full-thickness cartilage loss over the plateau and more diffuse grade III changes over the condyle posterior weight-bearing aspect. There is a chronic high-grade tear of the anterior cruciate ligament without acute translation." Based upon this MRI, Dr. Hannafin made the following report on October 19, 2006, "The MRI demonstrated significant progression of cartilage loss with grade III chondral loss medial femoral condyle. There is no re-tear of the medial meniscus. There is also grade II - III changes of the tibial plateau. This has clearly progressed from the arthroscopy photos of 5/2000 which demonstrated no cartilage loss on the tibial plateau and only Grade I changes on the medial femoral condyle." Dr. Hannafin also prescribed an "unloader brace" for petitioner to wear on his knee to help alleviate some of his symptoms.

On January 18, 2007, the Medical Board again considered Scialo's ADR application on remand from the Board of Trustees. After reviewing Dr. Hannafin's reports of October 3, 2006 and October 19, 2006, the Medical Board deferred making a decision until the MRI and Dr. Hannafin's reports could be referred back to its impartial orthopedic consultant, Dr. Basil Dalavagas, to determine if this would alter his previous opinion. The Medical Board also requested that Dr. Dalavagas re-interview and examine the petitioner.

On March 1, 2007, less than 10 months after his first examination of the petitioner, Dr. Dalavagas re-evaluated Scialo. Dr. Dalavagas reported that, at the time of this examination, petitioner now has "marked atrophy of the right quadriceps more than 3 cm." Dr. Dalavagas reviewed the October 2006 MRI of petitioner's right knee and stated, "[t]here is significant Grade III degenerative changes with chondral loss in the medial femoral condyle, softening of the articular cartilage in the medial tibial plateau and some softening of the articular cartilage in the lateral tibia plateau." Based on this examination, Dr. Basil Dalavagas stated, "Patient is [status post] arthroscopic partial medial meniscectomy in the right knee, approximately more than 6 years ago with clinical and MRI evidence of significant degenerative changes mainly in the medial compartment, less in the lateral compartment, with marked right quadriceps atrophy with significant functional deficit in the right

knee.” Dr. Dalavagas concluded by stating that, “I believe that now [firefighter] Anthony Scialo is permanently disabled for the performance of full fire duty.”

On May 3, 2007, the Medical Board again reviewed petitioner’s case. Based upon Dr. Dalavagas’ March 1, 2007 report and the October 6, 2006 MRI report of petitioner’s right knee, the Medical Board concluded, that while petitioner is now disabled, “there is insufficient evidence available to us that he was disabled for full fire duty at the time of his retirement and therefore it is our opinion that our previous recommendation remains unchanged.”

At its June 22, 2007 meeting, the Board of Trustees discussed petitioner’s case . . . [and] decided to table the issue until its next meeting. . . .”

The Board of Trustees reconvened on July 25, 2007. . . . [Deputy] Commissioner Douglas White (DC White)¹ stated, “I propose that we remand this to the 1B Board [Medical Board] with a copy of the discussion and the minutes that we’ve discussed in the last half hour, twenty minutes, with an instruction to clarify why they do not believe there was sufficient evidence that the member was disabled at the time of his retirement. . . . [w]e’re remanding with the minutes so the 1B Board can understand the views that have been expressed here with the instructions to clarify why they do not believe there was sufficient evidence that the member was disabled at the time of his retirement.” In response, Steven Cassidy (Cassidy), President of the Uniformed Firefighters Association of Greater New York, and First Vice Chair volunteered to create a summary of the issues in order to aid the Medical Board in understanding the Board of Trustees’ questions. Instead of remanding the matter after this meeting, on the advice of Cassidy, the issue was held over one month until the Board of Trustees’ next meeting so it could discuss the issues with petitioner’s attorney.

On September 5, 2007, the Board of Trustees again discussed petitioner’s case. The debate covered the discrepancy between Dr. Dalavagas’ two reports, the length of time it took this case to move through the system, and questions as to why the Medical Board would refer this case a second time to Dr. Dalavagas and then not take his recommendation that petitioner was now disabled. While discussing what questions the Board of Trustees wanted answered on remand to the Medical Board, Carolyn Wolpert (Wolpert), of the Office of the Corporation Counsel, Law Department, made the following recommendation, “You might ask the 1B [Medical Board] to explain their

¹ Douglas White’s title has been corrected herein to reflect he was the Deputy Commissioner.

decision. There is a report from Dr. Dalavagas from 2006 that said he is not permanently disabled, and if there is more reasoning as to why they think he was not disabled in 2004 and they set that forth in the report, that might help explain the decision.” [DC White] then issued the following instruction, “Remand it back to the 1B [Medical Board] with the instructions to look at the injuries of the member and the appropriate - - and the time line and details to determine whether or not there was a disability before retirement. I want them to look at this, the entire record, and explain to us in some detail how they reached that conclusion.” However, after an “off the record” discussion called by Joey Koch, the Mayor’s Representative, [DC White] stated as follows, “I said to remand it, but I think we should table it to find out any more information about the case and if we can secure anything from the member that we don’t have in the record. But my inclination is to remand it, not at this point, but we will table it until we can talk to the member to get additional information.”

The Board of Trustees next met on October 31, 2007. After more debate on what issues it wanted clarified by the Medical Board, the Board of Trustees tabled the remand until its next meeting in November in order to “frame these issues.”

At its November 26, 2007 meeting, Cassidy again offered to draft a question for the Medical Board from Board of Trustees with regard to Scialo’s file. To provide Cassidy time to prepare the question and forward same for the Commissioner’s review, [DC White] tabled the matter until the next meeting in December.

The Board of Trustees met on December 17, 2007. In addition to the debate over the two Dr. Dalavagas diagnosis, the delay in getting the petitioner’s file before the Medical Board, and the opinion of the Medical Board that insufficient evidence of a disability existed at the time the petitioner retired, there was discussion regarding whether or not a framed question even need be prepared. Unable to come to any conclusion, the Board of Trustees tabled the remand of this file until its January 2008 meeting. According to the record, [DC White] tabled the issue so “[t]he administrative staff [can] look into the case to determine certain coding and be prepared at the next meeting to render a judgment as to the referral of the case back to the 1B Medical Board or not.”

At this point, the court notes that the last time petitioner’s file was before the Medical Board was on May 3, 2007. The Board of Trustees, while trying to determine precisely what it wanted the Medical Board to address, tabled the remand of petitioner’s file at its June 22, July 25, September 5, October 31, November 26, and December 17, 2007 meetings. Including the

fact that there appears to have been no August 2007 meeting, the Board of Trustees delayed remanding petitioner's ADR application a total of seven months.

The Board of Trustees met again on January 30, 2008. With the decision to remand made, [DC White] stated, "I think it should be remanded with the 1B Board [Medical Board] to take a look at the 5/11/2006 report of Dalavagas and the 2007 report, and reconcile the issue of the right knee injury, whether or not the right knee injury in 2000 - - that his disability was an aggravation of the 2000 injury, and get back to us." After further discussion, [DC White] supplemented what was going to be remanded. He stated, as follows, "[s]o as an addendum to the referral back to the 1B Board [Medical Board] to take a look at the Dalavagas report from 2006 and 2007, additionally, we're going to forward the May 21, 2004 report of Dr. Hannafin with respect to the member to pay particular attention to the MRI and the impression-plan section of the report."

Despite these clear instructions, on February 7, 2008, Lei Tan (Tan), a member of the Board of Trustees, prepared the following remand memorandum from the Board of Trustees to the Medical Board. The memorandum reads, in its entirety, as follows, "The Board of Trustees reviewed the case of the above noted member during the regular meeting on 01/30/08. At that time it was directed that the Subchapter 2 Medical Board should clarify whether the member's right knee disability was an aggravation from the 04/1-/2000 injury. It was also directed that the following documents be forwarded to the Subchapter 2 Medical Board for review: 1) Dr. Jo A. Hannafin's report dated 05/21/04. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter."

There is no indication in the record why the remainder of [DC White]'s January 30, 2008 recommendations were not included in Tan's February 7th memorandum. Further, there is no explanation why any of [DC White]'s recommendations from any of the previous Board of Trustees' meetings, (i.e., remanding all of the minutes of the meetings), were not included in his recommendations from the January 30, 2008 meeting.

Based upon the incomplete February 7, 2008 remand memorandum, on February 28, 2008, the Medical Board again reviewed Scialo's case, for the first time since May 3, 2007, nearly ten months prior thereto. In denying the petitioner's ADR application, the Medical Board's report reads in its entirety, "On 2/28/08, the 1-B Medical board again considered the case of Anthony Scialo. The case was last reviewed on 5/3/07, at which time the member was denied disability retirement.

The 1-B Medical Board re-evaluated this case at the direction of the board of Trustees dated 2/7/08 and evaluated Dr. Jo A. Hannafin's report dated 5/21/04.

After evaluating the report, it is the opinion of the 1-B Medical Board that the right knee disability of 2007 was not aggravated by the injury of 4/10/00, this is based on a policy that the aggravating injury must be proximate to the disability. Therefore, it is our opinion that our previous recommendation remains unchanged."

Based upon the foregoing, the court, in a written decision dated April 9, 2007, remanded this matter back to the Medical Board for further review and findings with regard to petitioner's claimed line-of-duty right knee injuries and to include information not in its possession at the time the Board rendered its February 28, 2008 denial of ADR benefits to the petitioner. In addition, the court reasoned:

"The record bears out the conclusion that, on February 28, 2008, the Medical Board did not possess all of the relevant evidence [DC White] intended it to review as part of the remand. Additionally, there is a history of delays in this matter, including those delays by the Board of Trustees discussed above, that were not addressed by the Medical Board in its most recent denial, including consideration of the alleged "policy" that the aggravating injury must be proximate to the disability. Moreover, the Medical Board's determination is conclusive only if it is supported by some credible evidence and is not irrational (*see Inguanta*, 302 AD2d at 527). Here, the Medical Board's reference to a "policy", without articulating a rational basis for said policy or providing any details of the policy, does not constitute the requisite "credible evidence" because such credible evidence must be evidentiary in nature and not merely a conclusion of law (*see Meyer*, 90 NY2d at 147). The Medical Board's February 28, 2008 denial based upon causation is arbitrary and cannot be sustained in an Article 78 proceeding, such as the matter at bar (*see Drew*, 305 AD2d at 409)."

In response to the court's decision and order, the Board of Trustees remanded this matter to the Medical Board on May 29, 2009. At its July 19, 2009 meeting, the Medical

Board deferred its determination until its next meeting, citing the “complexity” of the matter. The Medical Board’s determination was again deferred at its September 17, 2009, May 6, 2010 and June 4, 2010 meetings for substantially the same reasoning. After apparently much debate, the Medical Board issued a denial of Scialo’s ADR application on July 29, 2010.

Petitioner brings this second Article 78 proceeding seeking, among other things, an order annulling the July 29, 2010 denial of his ADR application and directing he be retired pursuant to his ADR application or, in the alternative, a second remand of this matter back to the Medical Board with instructions to apply the correct legal standard.

In addressing the court’s prior order, and in opposition to Scialo’s petition, respondents allege that:

“At the Board of Trustees’ meeting on May 29, 2009, Board of Trustees Chair and Deputy Commissioner Douglas White clarified that his suggested inclusions of Board of Trustees’ minutes for review by the 1-B Medical Board in prior remands were not instructions with which the Board of Trustees failed to comply, but rather recommendations that the Trustees discussed on and off the record and ultimately decided against implementing.”

Further, respondents allege that the Medical Board reviewed the petitioner’s entire medical file and there is ample credible evidence to support its denial. That since the petitioner was found “not disabled” by Dr. Dalavagas in 2006, any delays prior to that examination would have no bearing on the “denial” determination. Indeed, since he was found not disabled in May, 2006, there was insufficient evidence that he was disabled at the time of his service retirement on May 21, 2004.

Respondents contend that pursuant to *Borenstein v New York City Employees' Ret. Sys.*,²

“there are two stages in the Medical Board’s fact- finding process: (1) the “threshold matter” of determining “whether the applicant actually ‘physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of city-service;’” and (2) the “recommendation to the Board of Trustees as to whether the disability was ‘a natural and proximate result of an accidental injury received in such city-service;’” Because petitioner was found to be not disabled at the time of his retirement, the Board of Trustees did not reach the second step, and the issue of whether the disability was a natural and proximate result of an accidental injury received in city-service, is not an issue before this court.”

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, respondents have routinely stated the premise that since the petitioner retired for service prior to the resolution of his ADR application, that he was not a “member in city-service” at the time his application was addressed, thus, the question before the Medical Board is whether the petitioner was disabled “at the time of his retirement” (relying upon *Bansely v Safir*, 195 AD2d 185, 185 [2002]). Respondents reassert this conclusion within their opposition to the instant Article 78. However, any fault for the fact that nearly two years elapsed between April 14, 2004 - the date the ADR application was submitted - and March 2, 2006 - the date the Medical Board first reviewed the ADR application - lays not with the petitioner. If the Medical Board wishes to justify a “denial” by arguing that it had insufficient evidence that a member was disabled at the time of his retirement, then perhaps it would be prudent to act in a more timely fashion on a member’s

² 88 NY2d 756 (1996)

ADR application. As they have not done so here, such argument is unavailing and the petitioner will not be penalized for failing to be in city-service, or for an alleged dearth of evidence, resulting from the Medical Board's failure to act timely on his application.

I. The Medical Board's Determination Regarding Disability

While characterized by respondents as only "recommendations," this court remains in agreement with DC White that clarification of the issues regarding this ADR application were warranted. The pertinent "recommendations," as noted in the court's prior decision, were as follows:

"The Board of Trustees reconvened on July 25, 2007. After similar contentious debate on the issues detailed, *supra*, [DC White] . . . stated: 'I propose that we remand this to the 1B Board [Medical Board] with a copy of the discussion and the minutes that we've discussed in the last half hour, twenty minutes, with an instruction to clarify why they do not believe there was sufficient evidence that the member was disabled at the time of his retirement. . . We're remanding with the minutes so the 1B Board can understand the views that have been expressed here with the instructions to clarify why they do not believe there was sufficient evidence that the member was disabled at the time of his retirement.

'On September 5, 2007: [DC White] then issued the following instruction: "Remand it back to the 1B [Medical Board] with the instructions to look at the injuries of the member and the appropriate - - and the time line and details to determine whether or not there was a disability before retirement. I want them to look at this, the entire record, and explain to us in some detail how they reached that conclusion.

'The Board of Trustees met again on January 30, 2008. With the decision to remand made, [DC White] stated: "I think it should be remanded with the 1B Board [Medical Board] to take a look at the 5/11/2006 report of Dalavagas and the 2007 report, and reconcile the issue of the right knee injury, whether or not the right knee injury in 2000 - - that his disability was an aggravation of the 2000 injury, and get back to us."

After further discussion, [DC White] supplemented what was going to be remanded. He stated, as follows:

‘[s]o as an addendum to the referral back to the 1B Board [Medical Board] to take a look at the Dalavagas report from 2006 and 2007, additionally, we’re going to forward the May 21, 2004 report of Dr. Hannafin with respect to the member to pay particular attention to the MRI and the impression-plan section of the report.’”

The court can find no explanation as for why the Medical Board, and not Dr. Dalavagas, addressed Dalavagas’ contradictory diagnosis. Further, the Medical Board’s above explanation offers, in conclusory fashion, what it considers the “most reasonable” explanation. The following discussion will elucidate why Dr. Dalavagas, and not the Medical Board, was in the best position to explain Dalavagas’ contradictory determinations.

Dr. Dalavagas found petitioner “not disabled” after his May 11, 2006 examination wherein he relied on a May, 2004 MRI (2 years old at that time), a current x-ray of the petitioner’s knee, and his physical examination. In declaring the petitioner “not disabled,” Dr. Dalavagas notes “[r]eview of patient’s x-ray show *no significant degenerative changes in the knee. . .*” (*emphasis added*). Dr. Dalavagas does, however, note a 1” atrophy in the petitioner’s right quadriceps which he feels can be alleviated with intense physical therapy.

Dr. Dalavagas found petitioner disabled after his March 1, 2007 examination wherein he relied, in large part, on an October 6, 2006 MRI and his physical examination. The October 6, 2006 MRI was performed at the petitioner’s request because of continued pain with his right knee. This MRI, was performed a mere *4 months and 26 days* after the May

11, 2006 examination by Dr. Dalavagas. In declaring petitioner disabled, Dr. Dalavagas stated that “[r]eview of the MRI, which was done in October/06, shows . . . *significant Grade III degenerative changes with chondral loss in the medial femoral condyle, softening of the articular cartilage in the medial tibia plateau and some softening of the articular cartilage in the lateral tibia plateau*” (*emphasis added*). Moreover, Dr. Dalavagas states that there is now “marked atrophy of the right quadriceps more than 3 cm.”

In light of these circumstances, several questions are raised, to wit:

- (1) Having stated in May, 2006 that the petitioner’s x-ray showed “no significant degenerative changes in the knee” and faced with the October 6, 2006 MRI showing “significant Grade III degenerative changes. . .” what possible degenerative changes could so quickly have occurred in the intervening 4 months and 26 days such that petitioner went from “no significant degenerative changes” to “significant Grade III degenerative changes” and causing Dr. Dalavagas to change his determination from “not disabled” to “disabled?” Would such a rapid degeneration not cause Dr. Dalavagas to reevaluate his May 2006 diagnosis wherein he used the outdated MRI?
- (2) Does the observation of a 1” right quadricep muscle atrophy, just above the complained of right knee, not seem to evidence that the petitioner was favoring his left leg, over his right? Considering (a) the muscle atrophy, (b) an x-ray purporting to show no degenerative knee changes, (c) an MRI (and clinical evidence) of right ACL laxity and, (d) the knowledge that Dr. Dalavagas was using a two-year old MRI, why would Dr. Dalavagas not order a new MRI at the time of his May 11, 2006 examination in an effort to explain these inconsistencies prior to declaring that the petitioner was not disabled? In its July 29, 2007 denial, the Medical Board too acknowledged the fact that a new MRI in 2006 may have resulted in a determination of disability.
- (3) The May 11, 2006 examination revealed a 1 inch atrophy in the petitioner’s right quadricep muscle. The March 1, 2007 examination reveals a “marked atrophy of the right quadriceps more than 3 cm.”

While there is no explanation for why Dr. Dalavagas switched to the metric system in his follow-up examination, the court notes that 3 centimeters is approximately 1.2 inches. Why does an extra 2/10 of an inch of muscle atrophy qualify as “marked atrophy” such that it supports a determination of permanent disability?

As a result of the above, the Medical Board’s July 29, 2010 denial is arbitrary, without a rationale basis and unsupported by credible evidence. Accordingly, this matter shall again be remanded to the Medical Board for further review consistent with this decision.

II. The Medical Board’s Determination Regarding Causation

In contravention of its position, the Medical Board, having discussed causation within and in support of its July 29, 2010 denial, has placed such issue squarely before the court thus, causation shall be addressed herein. Paragraph three of the aforementioned denial reads, in relevant part, as follows:

“After evaluating all of the above, we have attempted to answer the issues raised by Justice Bunyan. It is noteworthy that on April 10, 2000, the applicant, Anthony Scialo injured his right knee in an on duty accident, was operated on and returned to full duty on October of 2000. This is arguably a partial cause of his right knee disability, but the injury is not proximate to his application of June 14, 2004 . . . The policy that a causative injury must be proximate to the time of disability is clearly stated in the Administrative Code” (emphasis added).

Initially, the court notes that the Medical Board conclusively states that the April 10, 2000 injury, a basis for the ADR application, was an LOD injury. Secondly, a reading of the plain language of the denial finds a causal link (allegedly “partially”) between the LOD injury of April 10, 2000 and Scialo’s right knee disability. Finally, in response to the court’s request

for a rational, non-conclusory and evidentiary based explanation for its “policy” the Medical board states, in conclusory fashion, “[t]he policy that a causative injury must be proximate to the time of disability is clearly stated in the Administrative Code.” In sum, it appears that while the Medical Board now concedes that the April 10, 2000 LOD injury contributed to the petitioner’s disability, it bases its denial of the ADR application, in part, on the premise that, under the Administrative Code, the injury was not “proximate in time” to the application.

New York City Administrative Code § 13 - 353 reads as follows:

“Retirement; for accident disability. Medical examination of a member in city-service for accident disability and investigation of all statements and certifications by him or her or on his or her behalf in connection therewith shall be made upon the application of the commissioner, or upon the application of a member or of a person acting in his or her behalf, stating that *such member is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of city-service, as a natural and proximate result of such city-service, . . .* If such medical examination and investigation shows that *such member is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of city-service as a natural and proximate result of an accidental injury received in such city-service while a member*, and that such disability was not the result of wilful negligence on the part of such member and that such member should be retired, the medical board shall so certify to the board, stating the time, place and conditions of such city-service performed by such member resulting in such disability, and such board shall retire such member for accident disability forthwith” (*emphasis added*).

Despite respondents’ contention that the Medical Board “may have stated the principal in a legally inelegant manner,” the Medical Board actually misapprehended the code and misapplied the proximity test herein. As the section clearly sets forth, the test for proximity is whether the disability “is a natural and proximate result of an accidental

injury.” There is no requirement that the “injury must be proximate to the time of disability.” Further, the Medical Board also clearly admits that the April 10, 2000 injury is “arguably a partial cause of his right knee disability” thereby establishing the causal link required by the section. That respondents claim the injury is only a partial cause is irrelevant because the section only requires the injury to be “a” natural and proximate cause, not “the” natural and proximate cause. While the Medical Board’s July 10, 2010 decision attempts to explain the proximity policy in the same conclusory fashion previously adjudicated insufficient, it has, in effect, made the petitioner’s point in this matter. Having found a causal link between the LOD injury and the petitioner’s disability, the court fails to understand the basis for the Medical Board’s denial of Scialo’s ADR application based, in part, on this issue.

“[I]t is well-established law that an accident which precipitates an injury may be a proximate cause of that injury . . . [t]he causation rule . . . in tort law . . . is that an accident which produces injury by precipitating the development of a latent condition or by aggravating a preexisting condition is a cause of that injury (internal citations omitted)” (*Matter of Tobin v Steisel*, 64 NY2d 254, 259 [1985]).

As the second department held in *Matter of Mescall v Board of Trustees of N.Y. City Fire Dept., Art. 1-B Pension Fund*.³

“[T]here [is] no indication that the petitioner had a knee problem prior to becoming a fireman or that he had suffered [right] knee injuries which were not incurred in the line of duty. The only evidence before the Medical Board and the Board of Trustees was the petitioner’s medical records and the proof concerning his line-of-duty knee injuries. Under all these circumstances, we find that there was no objective medical evidence that the petitioner’s knee condition was the result of anything other than a line-of-duty injury. Therefore, petitioner was entitled to accident disability retirement (*see*, Administrative

³ 204 AD2d 643 (1994)

Code of City of NY §.13-353; *Matter of Jones v Board of Trustees*, 123 AD2d 628 [1986]; *cf.*, *Matter of Russo v Board of Trustees*, 143 AD2d 674 [1988]).”


Accordingly, the Medical Board’s justification for denying Scialo’s ADR application, in part, because the LOD injury was not “proximate in time” to the application is based upon a misapplication of the relevant standard thus, such justification is arbitrary, without a rationale basis and unsupported by credible evidence.

CONCLUSION

The Medical Board’s justification for denying the petitioner’s ADR application, in part, because it determined he was not disabled at the time of his retirement is arbitrary, without a rational basis and unsupported by credible evidence at this time. This matter shall again be remanded back to the Medical Board and said Board shall set forth its reasoning and evidence supporting its denial of ADR benefits to petitioner in light of the aforementioned issues which remain unexplained by its July 29, 2010 denial. Further, if the petitioner is found to have been disabled, satisfying the first prong under *Borenstein*, the Medical Board shall then set forth its reasoning and evidence supporting its denial under the correct proximity standard, despite having found a causal link between the petitioner’s April 10, 2000 LOD injury and such disability in light of the foregoing discussion.

The Court, having considered the respondents’ remaining contentions, finds them to be without merit. All relief not expressly granted herein is denied.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.

ENTER


HON. BERT A. BUNYAN
JUSTICE N.Y.S. SUPREME COURT